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ABSTRACT 
This chapter will examine the mechanics and materials of body armour in military, 
police and some security related applications to protect the wearer from penetrative 
threats. These threats will include battlefield threats such as shell fragments and high 
velocity bullets, and threats to law enforcement personnel such as handgun bullets and 
knives. Regardless of whether the threat is a high velocity bullet, or a knife, the 
essential requirements of body armour are the same; first an interaction must be 
established to capture the projectile and extract its kinetic energy; second this energy 
must be dispersed without undue damage to the armour or wearer. Both these aims 
need to be achieved without significant rearwards protrusion into the wearer. In 
addition to these protection requirements it is also clear that the armour must be as 
comfortable as possible and reasonably light. This chapter reviews some of the 
approaches used to provide protection based on the all these needs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Body armour has been a feature of soldier’s personal equipment since the earliest 
periods of organised warfare. The first records of armour date back to the third 
millennium BC but there is evidence of offensive weapons in the eighth millennium 
BC (Hackett 1989), so it is likely that the history of armour is of similar antiquity. 
Although this development process was almost purely empirical, the vast experience 
gained over thousands of years led to a variety of highly effective armour systems. 
Modern developments such as high strength synthetic materials have built upon this to 
develop systems which protect wearers against bullets, shell fragments or knives. As a 
result of these developments body armour is now an accepted part of everyday wear 
for both military and police personnel. 
 
This chapter will examine the mechanics and materials of body armour in military, 
police and some security related applications to protect the wearer from penetrative 
threats. These threats will include battlefield threats such as shell fragments and high 
velocity bullets, and threats to law enforcement personnel such as handgun bullets and 
knives. Regardless of whether the threat is a high velocity bullet or a knife, the 
essential requirements of body armour are the same; first an interaction must be 
established to capture the projectile and extract its kinetic energy; second this energy 
must be dispersed without undue damage to the armour or wearer. Both these aims 
need to be achieved without significant rearwards protrusion into the wearer. In 
addition to these protection requirements it is also clear that the armour must be as 
comfortable as possible and reasonably light. This chapter reviews some of the 
approaches used to provide protection based on the all these needs. 
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2. INJURY MECHANISMS 
To understand how armour functions, it is first necessary to look at the injuries which 
the armour seeks to prevent. The human body is not designed to resist deeply 
penetrative threats as these are not common in nature so lethal injuries can result from 
relatively low energy penetrative impacts. In English law a kinetic energy of just over 
1J is taken as the lower limit for lethality (Moore v Gooderham 1960 3 All ER 575; 
[1960] 1 WLR 1308), although for military purposes it is accepted that 80J are 
required to achieve a high probability of incapacitation from a small projectile 
(Cooper 1997). High velocity threats carry the additional probability that the very 
rapid transfer of energy during deep penetration produces a large temporary wound 
cavity with extensive tissue damage.  
 
Conversely the body is quite well protected against blunt impacts with the most 
sensitive organs lying beneath the skull or the rib cage. A soccer ball may have a 
kinetic energy approaching 200J and yet is accepted as relatively benign. For entirely 
blunt impacts it is not clear that energy criteria are applicable as it is the induced 
acceleration which becomes the lethal mechanism. In falls and car accidents the 
human body has been shown to be capable of withstanding up to 40 gravities  
(≈392ms-2) (Cooper 1997) which can equate to velocity changes in excess of 50ms-1 
and associated kinetic energy in excess of 50kJ.  
 
As a result of these observations it can be seen that armour must prevent penetration 
of a projectile and whilst there may be some advantage in attempting dissipate the 
impact energy this is not strictly necessary. As a result of this most armour is designed 
to be penetration resistant and does not have to absorb energy. 
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For soft body armour there is a concern that injuries can be caused by non-penetrating 
projectiles creating what is called behind armour blunt trauma (BABT) (Cannon 
2001). Whilst this is a possible danger, the incidence of serious BABT is very low. Its 
occurrence is confined to a small number of unusual cases where the armour has been 
struck close to its edge or a very high energy impact has been sustained. There is 
some concern that the pursuit of thinner and more flexible armour may lead to a 
situation where the bullet is retained by the armour but the armour is so flexible that it 
penetrates the body in what is called a pencilling injury. This is a narrow deformation 
of the armour which may cause perforation of the skin and underlying tissue. Plaster 
casts of both a ‘normal’ and pencilled backface signature imprint from a clay block is 
shown in figure 1. Whilst such injuries have been observed they are still rare but the 
main effect has been to cause certification authorities to retain a backface signature 
test within armour type approvals.   
 
Figure 1. Plaster casts of backface deformation onto a clay backing behind a textile 
armour showing a pencilled impact (left) and a blunt impact (right).  
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3. ARMOUR AND THREAT CHARACTERISTICS 
Given that the purpose of the armour is to resist penetration, the next step is to 
examine the mechanisms of penetration. In order to damage a target the aim will be to 
maximise kinetic energy delivered to and absorbed by the target. However, if the 
target is armoured then the projectile needs first to defeat this armour. Armour defeat 
requires that the energy is deposited in a form which causes the armour to be 
penetrated. This usually means that it must be concentrated over a sufficiently small 
area to achieve penetration; the degree of concentration of impact energy is referred to 
as kinetic energy density (KED). This is defined as the energy at impact divided by 
the presented area of the projectile.  This is probably the best single measure of 
penetration capability. As the KED is a measure of penetrative capacity it follows that 
a higher KED threat will require more penetration resistant armour. Hence the KED 
will be a major factor in determining the type of armour required to defeat a given 
threat. 
  
In addition to the KED, the velocity of the projectile is also important as the contact 
load is typically related to the square of the impact velocity. So a sharp or fast 
projectile will be very penetrative whilst a blunt or slow projectile will be less 
penetrative. The impact energy may not need to be absorbed by the armour but it is 
necessary to spread the impact load so that the wearer is not injured. Therefore the 
incident kinetic energy will also be a factor in armour defeat. 
 
Table 1 summarises typical threats to body armour and the corresponding armour 
types which are used to defeat them. A typical threat to a policeman might be a 
handgun such as a .357” Magnum. This threat is included in most body armour test 
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standards such as those issued by the US National Institute of Justice (Mukasey et al. 
2008) and the UK Home Office (Croft & Longhurst 2007a). The .357” Magnum is 
regarded as a powerful handgun but it usually uses a soft-point ammunition that is 
designed to mushroom and dissipate its energy quickly on impact with a soft target 
such as a human body. The projectile has a relatively low KED in the un-deformed 
state but this is lowered further by the post impact deformation of the form shown in 
figure 2. Therefore any reasonably penetration resistant material should be capable of 
resisting penetration of this type of projectile. As the armour needs to be worn on the 
body it is useful if it is both thin and flexible. Flexibility has the additional advantage 
that it will allow the armour to deform rearwards providing additional time or distance 
to transfer the impact energy.  It has been found that textile body armour based on 
multiple layers of high strength fabrics is capable of resisting penetration at the KED 
levels of the order of 20Jmm-2 which is typical of hand gun threats. The total kinetic 
energy is relatively low so textile armour does not require additional energy 
attenuation processes and is the most efficient solution. 
 
Figure 2. A 0.357” Magnum soft point projectile before firing (left), and deformed 
after impact with a textile armour (right). 
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Table 1. The characteristics of the main threat groups and the types of armour which 
are used to provide protection. 
 
 
In modern warfare the primary threat tends to be from shell fragments which typically 
cause 60-80% of battlefield injuries (Ryan et al. 1991). These fragments can be 
generated by a range of weapons such as artillery shells, mortars and grenades, but are 
also the main lethal mechanism from mines and improvised explosive devices. 
Therefore it has become customary to provide troops with combat body armour 
capable of protecting against typical fragments. It is difficult to devise a repeatable 
test using fragmenting munitions and so for specification purposes armour is tested by 
the impact of a gun launched projectile called a fragment simulating projectile (FSP) 
(Army Research Laboratory 2008) (Figure 3). Military body armour is typically 
required to provide protection against a 1.1g (17grain) FSP (Eriksen 2003). At 400ms-
1 the 1.1g FSP meets the 80J necessary for incapacitation and so most armour is 
designed to protect against it at impact velocities in the range 400ms-1 to 800ms-1. The 
KED of small fragments is in the same range as handgun bullets, therefore the 
Threat Velocity 
(ms-1) 
Kinetic 
Energy (J) 
Presented 
area (mm2) 
KED 
(Jmm-2) 
Armour Material
Handgun 
(.357”Magnum) 
450 1032 65 (initial) 
254 (final) 
16 
4 
Fabric 
1.1g (17grain) 
fragment  
450 111 24 4.5 Fabric 
Bowie Knife 8 42 0.25 160 Special Fabric 
Assault rifle 
(AK47) 
720 2050 24 45 Composite plate
HV rifle 
(SA80)  
940 1805 75 75 Ceramic plate 
 9
construction of combat body armour is similar to that of police armour and uses 
multiple layers of high strength fabrics.  
 
Figure 3. Fragment simulating projectiles (FSP) from left to right, 1.1g, .30”cal, 
0.50”cal, and 20mm. 
 
In regions where public gun ownership is low or within controlled areas such as 
prisons the knife becomes the prevalent threat. Knives and edged weapons are hand 
delivered so their velocity and hence kinetic energy is quite limited. However, the 
small contact area on the tip of a knife provides a very high KED which is easily 
capable of penetrating soft materials such as conventional high strength fabrics. 
Consequently knife resistant materials have been developed to provide the higher 
penetration resistance needed against high KED threats whilst preserving the thin and 
flexible properties of conventional textile body armour. Typical solutions have 
included modified fabrics, chain mail and articulated plates. 
 
Finally, there are the highly penetrative threats afforded by modern assault rifles. 
Rifle bullets have a variety of characteristics ranging from relatively low KED types 
such as the Kalashnikov AK47, to more penetrative types such as 5.56mm projectiles 
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of the M16 and SA80 assault rifles. In addition, it is possible to obtain hard cored 
armour piercing ammunition in most military calibres that provides an even more 
penetrative threat. This high penetrative capability and the high kinetic energy 
requires both a more resistant armour to achieve some energy transfer from the 
projectile and an ability to spread the contact loads to a much greater extent. The 
optimum armour solutions against high velocity rifle bullets range from polymer 
composites for the less penetrative projectiles to ceramic faced composite for higher 
velocity or harder types. These composite and ceramic faced composite armours are 
also used in suits worn by bomb disposal technicians to provide protection against 
very high velocity fragments experienced close to a bomb blast.  
 
4. TEXTILE BALLISTIC BODY ARMOUR 
Textile body armour has been used since the middle of the 20th Century but it can 
trace its roots back to the use of silk fabrics, leather and other multi layer systems of 
antiquity. The response of textile armour to ballistic impact is complex and not fully 
understood. Numerous studies of fabric systems have been published and the 
understanding has slowly developed based on single fibre tests, meso material models 
and recently to relatively complete numerical models of multi layer systems (Tabiei & 
Nilakantan 2008). Analytical and empirical models have been developed (Roylance 
1977) (Cuniff 1999) which seek to indicate the key fibre and fabric properties 
required in armour. However our understanding is still somewhat incomplete with the 
more subtle effects, such as inter yarn and inter layer interactions remaining to be 
fully characterised and with models which are only validated across relatively narrow 
sets of conditions and materials. 
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Figure 4. The pyramidal deformation of an aramid fabric during ballistic impact of a 
1.1g fragment simulating projectile. 
 
The impact and capture of a projectile by multi layer textile armour can be 
summarised as follows. Upon impact with the first layer of the armour the material 
under the projectile is instantaneously accelerated to the projectile velocity. Above 
some critical velocity the contact load is such that the yarns are failed and only a 
small amount of energy is extracted from the projectile. But the projectile is 
progressively decelerated and the ensuing layers accelerated until yarn failure does 
not occur. Assuming the yarns do not immediately fail then a tensile wave propagates 
along the yarns away from the impact point and in doing so some energy is absorbed 
from the projectile. The yarns are also driven rearwards (i.e. in the direction of 
movement of the projectile) but this rearwards movement propagates as a transverse 
wave approximately one order of magnitude slower than the tensile wave. Both waves 
propagate along the yarns they have struck (called the primary yarns) and also branch 
into the crossing yarns (called secondary yarns). The action of the transverse wave in 
the primary and secondary yarns is to form a pyramid of material and it is the kinetic 
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energy of the rearwards moving pyramid (Figure 4) which is the major dissipation 
mechanism during the early stage of impact. At later stages the elastic strain energy in 
the yarns starts to dominate the transfer process but it should be noted that as this is 
elastic strain the energy it is not being dissipated.  
 
The impact process in effect requires two things from the fabric or yarns; firstly they 
should not break so they should be strong (or tough) and secondly the imposed load 
and the resulting stress waves need to move quickly from the impact point. This has 
led the combined performance factor U* (Cuniff 1999) which states that the 
performance of fabric is the product of the specific yarn toughness and longitudinal 
wave speed of the yarn 
 
Where σ, ε, ρ and E are the ultimate tensile strength, strain to failure, density and 
longitudinal wave speed of the yarn. 
  
A number of other factors emerge as contributory properties of the fabric layer or 
armour system. If the yarns are loosely woven then there is a greater tendency for 
projectiles to part the yarns and penetrate without fully loading them; a process 
known a windowing. This effect is suppressed if the yarns are relatively closely 
woven; often this is described by a cover factor - the ratio of the projected area of the 
individual yarns to the area covered by the yarns when woven into fabric.  
 
ρρ
σε EU
2
* =
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These requirements result in a construction consisting of multiple layers of dry fabric.  
Multiple layers are required as it is necessary to decelerate the projectile within a 
reasonable distance and also because the impact velocity may be above the critical 
velocity of the first layers. It has been shown that thin armours are less efficient than 
thick armours but they are much better at stopping projectiles in short distances.  
 
The majority of textile systems use the same fabric type throughout their thickness but 
there are examples of armour using varied types. For instance the requirement for 
high cover factors is only for the layers in contact with the projectile so it may be 
beneficial to have high cover factors fabrics towards the impact face and coarser 
weave fabric to the rear. A preference towards lower cover factor coarse fabrics is 
economic as cost tends to scale with thread count. 
 
Although BABT is not a common problem there is a necessity to limit the 
deformation of the armour to a reasonable level. In this context test standards require 
that when tested on a clay based backing material the resulting depression or backface 
signature must not exceed some limiting depth such as 44mm (Mukasey et al. 2008) 
or 25mm (John Croft & Longhurst 2007a). The validity of these particular limits and 
the exact correlation of these backface signatures to BABT injury is unclear although 
it has received some attention (Wilhelm & Bir 2008). In any case, it is often necessary 
to modify the armour system construction in order to achieve a suitably low level of 
backface signature. Typical constructions use stiffened fabrics, padding or even steel 
‘shock plates’ behind the basic fabric pack.  
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These more peripheral design features mark the major difference between police 
armour systems and military armour systems. Current systems are almost entirely 
empirically designed and this has tended to indicate a number of threat and market 
driven optimisations. A police system designed to stop low velocity but relatively 
heavy handgun projectiles will often need to limit backface signature to work within 
specification. There are characteristic of handgun bullets which seem to favour tightly 
woven fabrics, although the reasons are not clear. Military systems are often only 
required to stop the 1.1g FSP which has insufficient kinetic energy to cause any 
backface signature so there is no need for trauma attenuation layers. 
 
In addition to these variations in the fibre properties, the ballistic properties are also 
influenced by factors within the fabric manufacture. Ballistic performance is usually 
improved by using a finer yarn, greater tightness of weave and optimising weave 
style. For example in one study an older design of armour used a 1500 denier Kevlar® 
29 yarn giving a ballistic limit velocity of 370ms-1 against a military fragment threat. 
A more recent design of the same weight of armour against the same threat uses 600 
denier Kevlar KM2® yarn has a ballistic limit velocity of 520 ms-1 (Ren 2002). It 
should be possible to further improve ballistic performance by using a unidirectional 
or non-crimped fabric as the crimp inherent in any woven fabric hinders load 
transmission along the fibre. 
 
5. KNIFE ARMOUR 
The threat from edged or pointed weapons is inherently variable because they are 
propelled manually, by a population with a wide variety of abilities and techniques. In 
addition the definition of edged weapons may cover a wide variety of knives, tools, 
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swords and other implements which may have various degrees of sharpness and 
different types of cutting edges. Unlike ballistic armour it is difficult to specify a 
typical weapon which represents a worst case threat; it is only possible to determine 
the range of weapons and attacks which may be expected.  Current and previous test 
procedures (Croft & Longhurst 2007b)(Petit & Croft 1999) (H P White 1988)(Parker 
1993) have included a variety of knives and spikes as illustrated in figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Typical edged weapons a) Lock knife, b) ‘Survival’ knife, c) Kitchen knife, 
d) ‘Bowie’ knife, e) Craft knife, f) Screwdriver, g) HP White spike (H.P. White 
1988), h) American ice pick, i) PSDB No1 test knife (Parker 1993), j) PSDB No5 test 
knife (Parker 1993) , k) HOSDB P1/B test blade (Croft & Longhurst 2007b), l) 
HOSDB Spike (Croft & Longhurst 2007b). 
 
Bleetman (1996) analysed the injuries presented in hospital emergency admissions by 
ordinary members of the public and examined the likely requirement of stab resistant 
armour to prevent stabbing injuries. It was found that the injury mechanism of 
stabbing was primarily blood loss and associated complications so lacerations to the 
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liver, spleen, lungs or outer parts of the gut can cause bleeding which is potentially 
life threatening.  Other injuries might include punctures to the chest wall leading to 
lung collapse, whilst damage to the heart and associated major arteries may be almost 
immediately fatal. It should be noted that the significant mechanism is the profuse 
blood loss and its associated complications rather than direct organ failure. A later 
study (Connor et al. 1998) assessed the depth of penetration required in order to cause 
damage to vital organs. Whole body computer tomography scans were used to 
determine skin to organ distances for a group of 71 subjects. It was found that the 
minimum distance of vital organs from the skin surface was approximately 10mm 
whilst median distances were of the order of 20mm. 
 
A number of studies have been made of the type and location of stab wounds and 
particularly of fatal wounds. A study of stab wounds according to impact site (Rouse 
1994) found that out of a total of 69 single fatal wounds 50 were to the chest, 12 to the 
head and neck, and 7 to the abdomen and lower limbs. For multiple fatal wounds (81 
cases), the wound causing the fatality was to the chest in 61 cases. In another study 
(Murray & Green 1987) it was found that of 27 single fatal wounds 18 were to the 
chest. It can be concluded from these studies that fatalities from stabbing are in the 
majority of cases due to chest injuries. Therefore protection of the chest will carry the 
highest priority if the aim is to prevent fatal stabbing attacks.  Armour protection 
should extend over as much of the torso as possible and should also cover the upper 
legs and pelvis if protection is to be maximised 
 
The penetrative power of knives is a product of the energy density achieved at the tip 
of the knife combined with the ability of the cutting edge to easily enlarge the 
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perforation. Current test standards require knife resistance for impact energies in the 
range 25-43 Joules, although this is much lower than the impact energy of a bullet it is 
applied over a very small area. This leads to very high contact forces such that the 
materials of the armour is indented and forced radially and backward away from the 
knife (figure 6a). In essence the problem is that the reverse of that in textile ballistic 
armour as the knife has little kinetic energy but it is difficult to extract this energy into 
the armour. A relatively blunt knife might have a tip radius of 0.25mm and an average 
person might produce a stab of about 40 J yet this will still result in a KED greater 
than that of a high velocity rifle bullet.  
 
Figure 6. Various mechanisms of knife penetration, a) Initial penetration due to high 
contact loads, b) Frictional resistance to continued penetration, c) Resistance to hole 
enlargement, d) Buckling of the knife blade. 
 
The simplest method of providing stab resistance is to use rigid plates of metal or 
composite. Such materials are sufficiently hard to defeat knives by resistance to 
indentation and to present a large resistance to further penetration should perforation 
occur (figure 6b-c). Metallic systems can offer good protection if they have sufficient 
hardness. Softer metals such as aluminium require greater thickness to achieve 
protection but are relatively light. Best results have been achieved with titanium and 
its alloys (Horsfall 2000) however these tend to be costly. Titanium has the advantage 
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of a very high work hardening rate and high toughness making it extremely resistant 
to puncture or cutting.  
 
Rigid armour may defeat a knife by simply resisting perforation or by causing the 
blade tip to buckle (Figure 6d). Thin sharp blades such as those found on domestic 
knives  (Figure 5c) will have a tendency to break or buckle. Heavily constructed 
blades such as those used for outdoor ‘survival’ purposes (Figure 5b) will be much 
less likely to buckle but their large cross sections will require large perforations to be 
produced in the armour. The different behaviour of thin sharp blades versus large 
heavy blades lead to the adoption of both types in early armour test standards (Figure 
5i-j)(Parker 1993).  
 
The main disadvantages of rigid armour are in wearer comfort and coverage. In order 
to allow sufficient movement of the arms and waist it is necessary to either reduce the 
coverage area or provide some means of articulation within the plates. The most 
common solution is to use multiple plates, these may be loosely held in multiple 
layers or some form of hinges may be fitted to the edges of single plates. Plate edges 
provide weak points in the armour, multiple layers increase both weight and bulk 
whilst effective and durable hinging appears to be difficult to achieve in practice. 
Such systems have become less common in recent years as fabric and chain mail 
systems have been sufficiently developed to give equivalent protection with greater 
flexibility and lower weight.  
 
Rigid armours have another important disadvantage; they cannot undergo significant 
bending or large scale deflection and must stop the threat within their own thickness. 
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This tends to mean that relatively hard or thick plates are needed to provide the 
required protection. This is in contrast to typical textile ballistic armour systems 
which deform rearwards into the wearer’s body to allow efficient energy transfer over 
a distance much greater than their original thickness.  
  
A better solution for knife protection would be fully flexible textile armour similar to 
that used for hand gun protection. This is possible if measures are taken to increase 
the cutting and perforation resistance of the weave. Most fibres have some resistance 
to cutting; aramid fibres such as Kevlar® and Twaron® probably being the best of the 
polymer types. However it is important that the knife is forced to cut these fibres 
rather than simply parting the weave. Measures must be taken to stabilise the weave 
and prevent the yarns or fibres being forced apart. This can be partially achieved by 
using much finer and tightly woven yarns. A low denier yarn is used and this is 
woven as tightly as possible with a correspondingly high cover factor. This approach 
is particularly successful against spikes (Figure 5f-h) and has seen significant 
applications in armour for prison guards who are typically exposed to improvised 
spike-like weapons.  As the spike has no cutting edges it is possible to prevent 
perforation simply by resisting the opening of the weave. The advantage of these 
systems is that they retain the full flexibility of textile armour and may offer some 
level of ballistic protection at the same time. 
 
Another method of improving fabric stability is to coat or laminate the fabric with a 
thin polymer layer so that the yarns are partially bonded together (Mayo et al. 2009). 
Although this solution reduces the fabric flexibility with consequent reductions in 
comfort and ballistic properties it may reduce the incidence of blunt trauma in 
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ballistic and blunt attack. It is also possible to laminate an abrasive onto the fabric 
which enhances the frictional interaction with a knife.  
 
Laminated textile armour is able to confer both knife and ballistic protection within a 
armour of reasonable flexibility and simple construction. These systems have become 
the dominant construction in the 21st Century.  The change from rigid or semi rigid 
systems to flexible ones has been partially a result of improved test and specification 
processes. More recent standards for knife resistant armour have adopted changes 
which tend to favour compliant armour which deforms under impact conditions (Croft 
& Longhurst 2007b) . A test knife is propelled into the armour under the action of 
gravity with the knife mounted ahead of a 1.25kg drop missile on a compliant 
mounting. This replicates the relatively extended kinetic energy transfer that occurs in 
a real stabbing event (Horsfall 1999).  The armour is mounted on a soft foam support 
which reproduces the compliance of a human chest and allows deformation of the 
armour. The result of this test method is that optimised armour will tend to be as 
flexible as possible to allow rearward deformation whilst at the same time having 
sufficient perforation resistance to prevent failure. The test standard allows up to 7mm 
perforation, information that was derived from earlier studies (Connor et al. 1998).  
 
Chain mail can also be used as a flexible knife resistant armour. In this case the action 
of the chain links is to capture the blades tip after a small amount of perforation.  It is 
therefore necessary to use either a very fine chain link diameter or to use a padding 
system. Typically the armour systems will consist of a layer of chain mail positioned 
on the front face of a conventional multi layer ballistic fabric pack. This construction 
has very good flexibility and provides both knife and ballistic protection at a 
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comparable, although slightly greater weight than a laminated fabric solution. It is 
however typically more flexible than the laminated fabric and has found particular use 
in female armour which needs this greater flexibility to allow for breast shape.  
 
Figure 7. Areal density of UK Home Office approved knife and ballistic resistant 
armour systems. HG1/KR42 tested according to the 1993 standard(Parker 1993), 
HG1/KR1 tested according to the 1999 standard (Petit & Croft 1999), and KR1 HG1 
SP1 is tested to the 2007 standard(Croft & Longhurst 2007b). 
 
Developments in knife and ballistic armour technology have led to a decrease in 
armour mass over recent years. This has also been accompanied by an increase in the 
flexibility of the armour systems and improved design. In the UK, police body armour 
is generally required to provide knife and ballistic protection. Initially the combined 
armour systems were both heavy and uncomfortable to wear. A change to the 
compliant knife missile and test support has allowed development of better knife 
resistant systems.  When combined with advances in armour technology and 
experience this has produced lighter systems and at the same time the armour has 
become more flexible. The UK Home Office has for the last 20 years tested and 
measured the performance of police body armour. Examination of the publicly 
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available data shows that the areal density (weight per unit area) of approved systems 
has reduced by almost a factor of three over the period of 1993 to 2010 as shown in 
figure 7. The data in the figure 7 is for armour which is certificated against the UK 
Home office low handgun threat (HG1) and a knife threat (KR42 or KR1) according 
to the test standards in force at the time.  In recent years the test standards have 
required armour of greater reliability and reproducibility which probably explains the 
lack of further weight reductions between 2002 and 2008. 
  
5. HIGH VELOCITY BALLISTIC ARMOUR 
For bullets having a KED of above 30Jmm-2 ballistic fabric systems become overly 
bulky. The contact loads tend to be sufficient to cause shear failure of the fibres and 
capture of the projectile occurs only after numerous layers have been perforated. For 
KED of 30-45Jmm-2 it is possible to provide protection by use of polymer matrix 
composites. In essence this is an extension of the tactic used in knife armour as the 
projectile is forced to break fibres and radially expand the perforation against 
significant constraint. It has been shown that at low KED flexibility is a key factor in 
projectile capture whilst at higher KED shear strength within the material becomes 
dominant (Walker 2001). In effect this marks a transition from a net like behaviour to 
a penetration and absorption behaviour. The 30-45Jmm-2 KED regime is of some 
practical importance as the slower velocity assault rifle projectiles such as those of the 
Kalashnikov AK47 fall within this range. Polyethylene fibre composites based on 
Spectra® or Dyneema® provide the most weight efficient systems in this range. 
 
Most western assault rifles use higher power ammunition in 7.62mm and 5.56mm 
calibres which result in higher velocity impacts with KED of 50Jmm-2 or greater. In 
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this regime it is necessary to promote disruption of the projectile in order to expand 
the contact area and reduce the KED. This is usually achieved with a hard ceramic 
disruptor layer, bonded to a tough backing or absorber.  This disruptor-absorber 
structure provides an efficient mechanism to dissipate the energy of high velocity and 
hard cored projectiles.  
 
Figure 8. Stages in the defeat of a projectile by a ceramic faced armour system. 
 
On impact with the ceramic face the projectile is either shattered or mushroomed. 
This process may result in some lowering of the incident KED as the contact patch is 
spread out. Under the contact paths the ceramic is in compression and initially resists 
break up, even when fracture does occur the resulting ceramic rubble will provide 
considerable resistance.   At the edge of the contact patch tensile stresses develop and 
lead to a ring crack which then grows into the ceramic forming a conoid with an 
included angle of approximately 130°. This material spreads the imposed load onto 
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the backing resulting in a low KED on the rear face of the ceramic as the projectile 
pushes the conoid base into the backing (figure 8). Little energy is absorbed by the 
cracking or shattering of the ceramic and most of the impact energy is transferred to 
the backing material . It is possible to quite accurately predict the ballistic 
performance of a ceramic faced armour simply from a knowledge of the ceramic 
thickness and absorbing characteristics of the backing materials (Florence 1969).  
 
Figure 9. The effect of projectile type on the areal density and type of ceramic 
required to provide protection. 
 
A number of studies have shown that ballistic performance of ceramic faced armour 
scales to some extent with hardness of the ceramic. The ceramic must have a hardness 
that is significantly greater than that of the projectile (Anderson et al. 1996) so that it 
can resist penetration. For soft cored projectiles (lead cored ‘ball’ ammunition) a 
relatively low grade ceramic such as a 95% pure alumina is appropriate.  For hard 
steel cored armour piercing (AP) based projectiles, which are common in light armour 
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piercing ammunition, there is some advantage to using a higher grade (98% pure) 
alumina. However tungsten carbide (WC) cored projectiles have a hardness level 
equal to or greater than most alumina compositions. Therefore where such hard-cored 
projectiles are a threat there is a need to choose ceramic materials such as silicon 
carbide as illustrated in figure 9.    
 
The absorber materials are in most cases very tough polymer composites. These may 
consist of aramid fibres in a tough matrix such as heavily plasticised and toughened 
polymer resin or neoprene. Polyethylene fibre composites are also widely used 
although typically these consist of pressure consolidated laminates rather than using 
resin infiltration. Most systems have a covering of fibre composite or fabric to provide 
an impact resistant and to enhance the damage tolerance of the system. Optimisation 
studies (Hetherington 1992) have shown that the ceramic face should amount to 
approximately two thirds of the total mass of the system with the absorber making up 
the rest.  Another purely empirical rule of thumb is that the ceramic layer should have 
a thickness approximately equal to the threat weapon calibre. 
 
The ceramic faced armour is typically used in the form of a large plate which may be 
worn on the front and/or rear of the torso. Armour of this type is common in military 
service with a range of plate types and sizes being available.  Some armour designs 
also incorporate ceramic faced plates on the sides of the torso and the shoulders 
although such designs become cumbersome and are limited to use in high risk and 
largely static applications. Textile body armour is typically used to back and mount 
the ceramic faced and serves as a last energy-absorbing layer. This backing also 
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provides protection to the whole torso against lower level threats whilst the rigid 
panel typically only covers the centre of the torso.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The protection requirements of body armour can be reduced to two processes; a need 
to promote an interaction mechanism to extract kinetic energy from the projectile, and 
a mechanism to disperse this energy without transferring excessive loads or 
deformation into the wearer.  
 
Handgun bullets deform easily and so provide a simple interaction mechanism with 
fabric armour. However the energy of these projectiles is sufficient that care is needed 
to prevent excessive intrusion of the armour into the wearer’s body. High strength 
fabrics in suitably constructed systems provide an efficient solution. 
 
Edged weapons such as knives represent a very penetrative threat which requires 
special fabrics or metals in order to generate an interaction with the armour. However 
the total energy of the impact is sufficiently low that no special measures are required 
to dissipate or spread the induced loads. Typical solutions include specialised fabrics, 
chain mail and articulated metal plates. 
 
For protection against high velocity bullets there is a twin problem of providing 
penetration resistance and of dissipating large amounts of energy and associated 
shock loads. A full solution requires a combination of composite plates often with a 
ceramic facing and ballistic fabric backing layers to provide support and to give good 
coverage. 
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